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Governance: Coordination, Regulation and Control

Page history last edited by Vong Phalla 15 years, 3 months ago

 

Tool 3 - Governance: Coordination, Regulation, and Control 

 


Introduction

 

The analysis of governance aims to investigate the rules operating in a value chain, and the system of coordination, regulation and control in which value is generated along a chain.

 

Governance refers to both the "official" rules that address output, and the commercial imperatives of competition that influence how production is structured. Governance implies that interactions between actors in the value chain are frequently organised in a system that allows competitive firms to meet specific requirements in terms of products, processes, and logistics in serving their markets. As such, it recognises that power is not evenly distributed, and access to market opportunities for the poor requires understanding of how production systems are organised to meet these competitive requirements.

 

Because "governance" looks and sounds like “government”, the term is often interpreted narrowly to include only the legal and regulatory requirements that influence business operation and market access in a value chain. In actual fact, the instruments of governance range from contracts between value chain participants to government regulatory frameworks to unwritten "norms" that determine who can participate in a market.

 

Requirements may be “official” or “unofficial” and may originate within or outside of the value chain. These may be as simple as the requirement imposed by wholesalers that agricultural products be correctly harvested to prevent damage and degradation. Conversely, they may be as complex as a foreign government’s enforcement of international standards regarding permissible levels of pesticide residues on imported products. Another example is the procedures imposed by a multinational firm as a condition of participation by a subcontractor in its global supply chain. There is a host of possible influences of governance in between these extreme examples, and value chain analysts should work to clearly understand what factors influence the organisation of production and the position of poor farmers and other producers in these arrangements.

 

Regardless of the level at which rules originate, poor value chain participants can find opportunities for upgrading and participation in higher-value markets where they have the resources to learn about requirements of participation in markets. Value chain actors may have limited access to services and other forms of support required for meeting value chain standards; insufficient support can hamper their possibility to actively participate in higher-value segments of the chain. Access to information about commercial requirements, standards and compliance-related services that may be delivered through government, semi-public initiatives, or through the private systems of value chain coordination, are key concerns in analysing upgrading opportunities for poor producers.

 

The analysis of value chain governance and services is best approached by separating three dimensions: Coordination Structures, Rules and Regulations, and Control Mechanisms (Transmission of Information and Services).

 

Governance is one dimension of social capital, as illustrated in the Figure 1 below:

 

  

Source:[1]

Tool 3 - Figure 1: Dimensions of social capital related to value chains

 

Objectives

 

The main objectives of governance analysis are to:

 

  • Understand how the value chain is coordinated, including key firms (actors) and mechanisms (i.e. contracts, agreements, services), and why this coordination structure has arisen and evolved
  • Map the formal and informal rules, regulations, and standards that influence the value chain, how compliance to the rule is monitored, and what sanctions and incentives are used to ensure compliance
  • Assess the impact of the rules on different sets of actors, particularly on disadvantaged groups
  • Assess how different groups of value chain participants receive (or lack access to) adequate forms of support that can help them achieve the required standards
  

Key Questions

 

  • What system of coordination is in place to meet commercial objectives related to quality, quantity, and consistency and/or to ensure compliance with standards? Which are the “lead” or “coordinating” firms in this system?  Is coordination mostly based on formalised arrangements (contracts, for example), or is coordination informal?
  • What are the rules and standards, both official and commercial, that actors involved in the value chain must comply with in order to participate?  Where do they originate?  How are they enforced?
  • What are the effects of each rule on the participation (economic activities) of the poor, particularly relating to the actors that enforce these rules and the systems in place to coordinate production
  • How is information about applicable rules, standards and services to support ‘compliance’ transmitted through the value chain, particularly through the lead firm or its coordination system?
  • Does the inability of poor producers to comply with these rules, either due to lack of information or capacity, limit participation in higher-value activities, or prevent upgrading of the value chain as a whole?

 

Steps

 

It is difficult to capture all of the governance and services issues in a fixed-format questionnaire. Most of the data needed for analysing governance is of qualitative and un-quantifiable nature. For this reason, it is recommended to use open-format and intensive interviews with value chain participants and key informants; this is particularly true when approaching an unfamiliar value chain.

 

Step 1     Map actors.

 

Generate a list of all the actors (within and outside the value chain) that are potentially able to influence the governance structure. Use the mapping tool to identify all the relevant actors within the value chain. Identify other external organisations and institutions through interviews with key actors in the chain. To build a more complete list, both desk research and qualitative interviews with key actors in the chain are advised. Actors from lower levels of the chain may not have knowledge of wider rules, so interviews should primarily be held with major players, particularly with final links that interact directly with international markets.

 

Once the list is complete, it can be ungrouped for each level of the value chain based on different categories including wealth (poor, average, better off); business type and scale (micro, small, medium, large); ethnicity; and gender. Particularly when pro-poor analysis is involved, separating actors according to wealth and scale is very important. The categories can prove useful to analyse the impact of the governance structure on different groups, assess the level of information asymmetries along the chain etc. List all actors in a table and arrange them on a chart.

 

Step 2     Determine the demand and supply conditions of the value chain.

 

Demand and supply conditions, which may vary over years and seasons, and also vary greatly between markets, influence the governance of the chain and the power of different actors. It is important to map out the demand and supply conditions throughout the year to get a good overview of how governance evolves over time.

 

For example, in Svay Rieng province in Cambodia vegetable collectors are employed elsewhere, and therefore not available, in the off-season[2]. This makes it more difficult for remote off-season farmers to market their product. In cassava production systems in Vietnam the dominance of actors is determined by the season[3]. In the peak harvest season, with oversupply of fresh roots and only one market channel active, the main starch processors set and enforce regulations and pricing of starch content. However in off-seasons, with both fresh root and dried chip market channels active, it is the collectors who determine which channels will be supplied.

 

   

 

Source:[4]

Tool 3 - Figure 2: Example of bargaining power, chances for contracting systems and chain governance for perishable goods

 

Step 3     Determine the dominant coordination arrangement(s) in the value chain. 

As a system of production, every value chain has a system of coordination which includes formal and informal arrangements between participants. Coordination structures are constantly evolving to allow firms to fulfil the competitive requirements of intermediate and final markets, to ensure compliance with official or unofficial rules and standards, and to make better use of capital investments. These coordination structures may range from very loosely-coordinated, market-based trading structures, to intensely coordinated, vertically integrated, production. These are illustrated in the two graphics below.

 

 

 Source:[5]

Tool 3 - Figure 3: Global value chain classification. The different types of global value chains are ranked according to the degree of power asymmetry and explicit coordination.

 

 Source:[6]

Tool 3 - Figure 4: Value chain typology applied to pro-poor Markets. The different types of value chains are classified according to the level of integration and coordination in the respective markets.

 

The companies most directly accountable for the configuration of production systems, and for enforcement of rules throughout the value chain as a condition of selling their products in intermediate or final markets, are referred to as “lead firms”. In general, more restrictive or complex rules determining access to customers generate more sophisticated systems of vertical coordination by lead firms, even within a single industry. More stringent rules and requirements stimulate lead firms to exert more direct control over production and transportation of goods, since they are ultimately accountable to governments and consumers for the compliance of their goods with official or unofficial requirements. Their choices (and the choices of their agents) about which producers can participate in their supply systems have enormous, direct impact on the participation of the poor in value chains.

 

There may be more than one system of coordination operating in a single value chain in any given area, for example, where independent and contracted producers exist side-by-side; see Example 1: Three Coordination Systems in the Zambia Cotton Value Chain.

 

Step 4     Analyse how target populations participate in the value chain.

 

The conditions under which producers participate in a value chain can be understood and mapped using a number of dimensions, though two are particularly useful:

 

  1. Functions undertaken in the value chain: Inquire as to the range of activities that poor participants undertake in a given value chain 
  2. Formal Coordination:   This includes formality of contracts under which participants operate in the coordination system, including contracted input provision, marketing, certification, contract farming or outgrowing, or final product sales to buyers.  It also may include producer-driven formalisation of collective activities (associations, groups, or other vehicles of collective action) to reduce costs, increase revenues or reduce individual risks.

 

Understanding target populations' functional range and formality of participation can be useful in understanding opportunities for upgrading.

 

The accompanying figure shows the possible positions of small producers within a chain, with the functions undertaken placed along the vertical axis and the type and level of contractualisation and coordination with other chain actors or among themselves on the horizontal axis.

 

Tool 3 - Box 1: Example of possible positions of smallholders in a value chain 

 

(1)    Entering the chain (→1)                

(2)    Improving on existing production activities (1→1)

(3)    Adding value by taking on more functions (1→2)

(4)    Increasing contractualisation (1→3)

(5)    Co-coordinating a chain segment (1→4)

 

 

Step 5     Identify rules and regulations.

 

There are generally rules, regulations, and standards that value chain actors must abide by in order to participate in the chain. Rules and regulations can be either formal (with official legislative backing) or informal (determined by commercial norms). Voluntary standards that provide products with specific designations, such as organic or fair trade exist somewhere in-between. At the same time, rules can be set by actors within and outside the value chain. In the past, rules were largely concerned with meeting basic cost parameters and guaranteeing supply; they usually involved agreement between buyers and suppliers within the chain. At present, developing country agricultural producers face significant barriers to accessing developed markets due to well-developed product standards. These standards motivate development of new production systems and organisational forms.

 

Conversely, the dominant rules in local markets, particularly where official standards are weak or poorly enforced, tend to be commercial standards related to product quality, grading, and business practices. In these very loosely coordinated systems, wholesalers or traders may serve as de facto lead firms, enforcing rules upon producers through differential pricing and providing limited information or assistance with compliance. Monopolistic local trading structures may also disadvantage producers. Rules may not be communicated or may vary between localities within a national market. Poor producers also may not understand rules related to product quality or other commercial requirements and therefore may engage in antagonistic relations with buyers, which can aggravate other value chain dysfunctions.

 

In general, the standards faced by producers participating in export markets are vastly more complex than those governing local and national markets. While official and commercial standards usually apply in both cases, the need to comply with multiple and overlapping international standards related to production conditions constitute an important barrier to entry for poor value chain actors who wish to participate in export-oriented value chains.

 

Nonetheless, better understanding of, and compliance with, local commercial rules is generally a pre-condition for value chain upgrading. It might also be considered a stepping-stone to export strategies, since producers are unlikely to be able to comply with complicated standards if they are unable to understand, accept, and comply with the basic requirements of local markets

 

Tool 3 - Box 2: Example of power imbalance - The shrimp export industry in Bangladesh 

In 1997, the fourth leading export item in Bangladesh was frozen shrimp and fish, with a 7.3% share of the total export market. The major importers were the European Union (EU; 34–50% of Bangladesh’s exports), the United States (23–38%), and Japan (15–26%), depending on the year. At that time, the value per kg of Bangladesh’s frozen shrimp was lower than average for the Asian region. Bangladesh had a reputation for producing seafood that did not always meet minimum international standards as specified by the Codex Alimentarius Commission. With a low percentage of the world market, a lower-valued product, and a negative reputation in quality, Bangladesh was a price-taker rather than a price-setter.

 

THE EU BAN

 

On July 30, 1997, the EU banned imports of fishery products from Bangladesh, as a result of inspections of Bangladesh’s seafood processing plants. Inspections found serious deficiencies in the infrastructure and hygiene in processing establishments and insufficient guarantees of quality control by Bangladeshi government inspectors. The ban was estimated to cost the Bangladesh shrimp-processing sector nearly US$15 million in lost revenues from August to December 1997. The impact on both the industry and the economy of Bangladesh was substantial. The only way Bangladesh could strengthen its export position in the shrimp market was to improve the safety and quality of its exports. Over the last decade, with a major effort in the late 1990s, safety improvements have been made by the industry and government, with the technical assistance of bilateral and multilateral agencies. While the short-term loss in foreign currency from the EU ban was high for a developing country, the ban did increase the commitment by industry and government to raise product quality to meet international standards. Both exporters and government made major investments in plant infrastructure and personnel training in order to achieve international technical and sanitary standards. This included new employee acquisition and training, sanitation audits, plant repair and modification, new equipment, new laboratories and other costs.

 

INVESTING IN SAFETY

 

Some upgrades were in progress at the time of the EU ban. By 1997, the Bangladesh shrimp processing industry had invested $17.6 million in plant upgrades, the government had invested $382,000 in laboratory and personnel upgrades, and outside partners had invested $72,000 in training programs in Bangladesh. Unfortunately, these improvements were not enough to prevent the ban. The total fixed investment cost of $18 million was only slightly higher than the nearly $15 million in lost revenue from the ban over a period of five months. These improvements would have almost been paid for, had they been implemented in time to make the ban unnecessary. Research has also determined that the annual recurring costs to maintain HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point) programs and meet international standards would be $2.2 million for industry and $225,000 for government. Subsequent inspections by the EU determined that some plant improvements met EU standards. Subject to certain provisions, the EU ban was lifted for six approved establishments for products prepared and processed after December 31, 1997. By July 1998, a total of 11 plants had been approved for export to the EU. Collective efforts by the industry, the Bangladesh Department of Fisheries, and the Bangladesh Frozen Food Exporters Association have continued to strengthen the export-processing sector. By 2002, of the 65 plants licensed for export by the government, 48 plants had EU approval. 

 Source:[7]

 

Step 5 is mainly concerned with generating a clear understanding of the rules that influence actors in the value chain; identifying the actors that set the rules; understanding the reasons behind the rules; assessing how the rules affect different categories of actors within the value chain; understanding how much different actors know about the rules; and assessing the rate of change of the rules.

 

Tool 3 - Table 1: Types of rules and standards affecting value chains 

Type

Example

Enforcement and Sanction

Official "legal" standards

Prohibition of pesticide residues on imported vegetable products

Ban of non-compliant products from destination market

Voluntary Standards

Production requirements for organic certification and labelling

Ineligibility for certification or value-added labelling

Commercial Requirements or Norms (“Rules of Trade”)

Tangible product requirement such as volume, size, colour, composition, or freshness, which may be codified or not

Spot rejection of product by buyer at delivery or collection, or reduced price acquired by seller (downgrading)

 

Identifying rules and regulation should begin by interviewing key actors in the chain (e.g. lead or coordinating firms, major processors, exporters), as they should be more aware of these issues. In locally-focused value chains, wholesalers or other key intermediaries may be the most important sources of information on de facto standards and rules, as informal commercial norms are more common in these situations. 

 

After the initial interviews, other actors can be interviewed following backward linkages in the chain. Initial information could be gathered using semi-structured interviews. During the first round of semi-structured interviews with key actors, a questionnaire could be developed based on the following guidelines. Different sections can be chosen depending on the desired focus of the research:

  • Ask  the informant to list all the rules and regulations (formal and informal) that they must follow in order to operate in their market segment, and the consequences of failing to comply. Ask the informant to clearly explain how the rules are translated in detailed sets of instructions related to cost, quality, processes, delivery times etc. Also, take note of additional sources of information you might later consult if you need to know more about the requirements of each regulation (e.g. websites, statutes, legal documents).
  • Ask  the informant to list all the rules and regulations that they require their suppliers to follow. Ask them to list all the actors (or categories of actors) with whom they directly stipulate arrangements (contracts, informal agreements) according to each rule. Ask them to explain how the rules are communicated in the form of instructions on, for example quality specifications, costs, delivery time, inputs, equipment and processes to be used for production.
  • For each rule or regulation (both upstream and downstream), ask the informant to explain the main advantages and disadvantages of compliance. Examples of advantages might be: expanded market access; possibility to implement a reliable quality management system; efficient production plans. Disadvantages might include: high costs and decreased profit margins; demanding requirements in terms of processes, technology, scale; difficulties in finding local suppliers or skilled workers that can match the requirements.
  • For each rule or regulation, ask the informant to explain why it is necessary, and how it helps maximise the efficiency and the level of coordination within the value chain.
  • For each rule or regulation, ask the informant to explain how the rules have been set, who set them, and when the rule was set. Also, try to understand if there have been major changes in the rules over time, and how the changes have affected business.
  • For poor participants in the value chain, pay particular attention to whether they understand the rules, particularly when formalised. For example, if there is a written contract, can the poor understand the terms?

Following interviews, there should be enough information to generate a matrix of key regulations, voluntary standards, and commercial rules that impact each value chain segment, and the enforcement and sanctions associated with each rule for value chain participants.

 

matrix can be used to summarise the findings, and also offers a tool for structuring some sections of the questionnaire, which can supplement the qualitative analysis during the next rounds of interviews. 

 

Tool 3 - Table 2: Example of matrix for actors and regulations.A matrix such as this provides an overview of the governance of the value chain; the blue boxes indicate that the compliance with the rule is required by the relevant authority or actor.

 

 

Rule 1

Rule 2

Rule 3

Rule 4

Rule 5

Rule 6

…….

European Union

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Government

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Industry Association

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Exporters

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Assemblers

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Buying agents

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Pre-processors

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Local traders

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Producers

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

………..

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 Source: Adapted from information in[8]

 Tool 3 - Figure 5: A graphic example of the different levels in the value chain that individual rules might apply to

 

Try this idea: Comparing results across different categories of actors

 

Important information can emerge from the comparison of tables, maps and indicators grouped for different categories of actors (e.g. poor farmers, small-scale processors). 

For example, try to compare the rules map that emerge from each group of actors, as these will give you an idea of how different groups perceive the overall structure of the value chain. It is likely that strong information asymmetries will emerge from the comparison.

 

Step 6     Analyse the impact of rules on value chain participants (including enforcement, rewards, and sanctions).

 

Step 6 is mainly concerned with the following issues: identification of who monitors compliance to the rules; identification of the system of sanctions available to punish defectors, and the system of incentives used to promote the application of the rules; and assessment of the effectiveness of the sanction / incentives system

 

Enforcement includes the methods and tools used to check compliance with the rules, and the system of sanctions used to promote observance of the rules. Without effective enforcement, rules may be set - but not kept. The first aspect of enforcement is monitoring at different stages of the chain and the second aspect is the sanctioning system; it can include both sanctions (aimed at punishing defectors) and incentives or rewards (to encourage observance of the rules). Though government regulatory capacity may be important to enforcement, it is not exclusively, or even principally, a government function. Depending on the coordination structure, lead firms may have significant enforcement power, for example, to exclude non-performing producers from chains by revoking contracts or reducing prices.

 

It helps to produce a list of the actors involved in the enforcement system. Two separate sets of matrixes can be generated, one of monitoring actors / monitoring tools, another of sanctioning actors / sanctioning tools. In the case of enforcement, it is particularly important to collect data regarding the frequency of inspections received by each actor from the different monitoring agents. Also, it is important to record the frequency with which each actor has been subject to specific forms of sanctions. It can also be important to compare maps and tables across different categories of actors (poor / non-poor).

 

Step 7     Analyse target sector knowledge and awareness of rules, norms and standards, and identify key gaps.

 

While producers and other poorer value chain participants may be subject to numerous sets of rules and standards, they may not understand the rules or be empowered to respond

 

On the other hand, rules, quality standards, and norms may not be written down or may vary within and across market areas. They may also change in response to market offerings.

 

It is important to assess the level of transparency in monitoring and enforcing the rules. For example: are quality requirements clearly set in contracts, and translated in an explicit set of parameters that cannot be subject to discretional interpretations? Are independent parties involved in the monitoring process, or is it totally managed by powerful actors? Discretional quality controls coupled with power asymmetries can result in a monitoring system that disadvantages the poor. Furthermore, discretional rules can result in corruption.

 

Take Note

In the Farmer Marketing School (FMS) approach used by the CIDA funded Cambodia Agricultural Market Information Project (CAMIP), value chain actors (producers and traders) formalise the local grading standards by discussing the objectively verifiable criteria of quality and subsequently the parameters per grade for each criterion. The objective is to come to a commonly agreed upon standard for grading.

 

Tool 3 - Table 3: Example of Farmer Marketing School grading table (Yard long bean in Kampot, Cambodia)

Criterion

Grade 1

Grade 2

Grade 3

Length

> 45 cm

> 30 cm < 45 cm

< 30 cm

Colour

Dark green

Dark green

Any colour

Blemishes

No blemishes

< 5 spots/bean

> 5 spots/bean

 

Step 8     Analyse how information and services are provided internally through the value chain and externally.

 

Services define the ways in which actors within and outside the chain provide assistance to other value chain participants, to help them meeting the requirements of rules and regulations. Services can be provided by actors within the chain, as in the case of leading buyers (or their buying agents) that directly help their suppliers achieve quality standards. Alternatively, services can be provided by actors outside the chain.

 

The main focus of service analysis is to understand by whom (and through which means) value chain participants are supported in achieving competency as suppliers within the coordination system and compliance with rules and standards that are in place. This analysis also can help assess whether the level of support is adequate to the requirements of value chain upgrading

 

The main questions to be addressed are the following: who provides assistance to value chain participants; which forms of assistance are available for different categories of value chain actors; what is the degree of satisfaction of different categories of actors with the services and assistance provided; and which linkages or services should be improved.

 

It is important to assess the level of services and support the poor receive from other actors within the value chain (for example, lead or coordinating firms, contract farmers, key wholesalers or other buyers) and from external organisations.

 

Particular attention should be given to understanding the ways in which actors within or outside the value chain are providing assistance to less advantaged participants in understanding and complying with commercial and regulatory requirements.

 

Tool 3 - Table 4: External actors assisting firms to meet chain rules 

  Change agents Sources of data

External to the chain

  • Consulting firms
  • Learning networks
  • Government agents

 

 

  • Interviews with consultants;
  • CEO or production control in firms;
  • Business Associations CEO or production control in firms;
  • Interviews with government officers (local and national) responsible for industrial policy
Internal to the chain
  • Rule-setting firm
  • Buying agent of rule setting firm
  • First-tier suppliers, or other leading suppliers to rule-setting firm 
  • Supply chain management or purchasing function in purchasing firms: CEO or production control in supplying firms Interviews with agent and CEO of recipient firms; supply chain management operations

 Source: [9]

 

What should be known after Analysis is complete

 

After having followed all the steps, the key questions outlined below should be able to be answered: 

 

  • What are the value chain's coordination structures?
  • What is the role of lead firms in coordination?
  • Where do targeted populations fit into the value chain in its various coordination structures? 
  • What are the formal and informal rules that regulate the actions of value chain participants?
  • How are rules monitored and enforced? Which are the sanctions and incentives used to make the rules effective
  • Do disadvantaged value chain actors have access to information about the formal and informal rules that shape their participation in the chains?
  • What services are delivered to producers through the coordination structure?
  • Are there effective systems to support participants in meeting the rules and requirements of the value chain?

 

Useful Examples

Tool 3 -Example 1: Three value chain coordination systems in the Zambian cotton value chain

Source:[10]

 

Tool 3 - Box 3: Coordination structures in the cotton value chain in Zambia - the Distributor model 

Dunavant employs four Operations Managers, based in each of the Provinces in which Dunavant operates. They manage the production, loan systems and credit recoveries in their respective areas. They interact with the Distributors (village-based agents who work on a commission basis) through their field staff and are responsible for all production activities within their region.

 

The Operations Managers are assisted by eight Area Managers to oversee the activities of the Shed Area Managers and distributors in their area. The Area Managers ensure that company protocol is followed and activities are undertaken correctly. Their role is to manage and monitor the Distributor system, oversee field activities and to report back to the company through the Operations Managers.

Dunavant employs 65 Shed Area Managers, and (in 2004/2005) contracted some 2,400 Distributors. Their respective role and responsibilities are:

  

Shed Area Managers

  • Manage and monitor the distributors, including distributor record keeping;
  • Coordinate and facilitate between the company and the distributors;
  • Receive inputs from the company and disburse these to the distributors;
  • Assist with technical support and advice to the distributors;
  • Disseminate information from the company to the distributors;
  • Monitor product deliveries; and 
  • Oversee loan recovery.

 

Distributors

  • Collect and pay the company a fee of ZMK 1,500 per bag of cotton planting seed, which should be collected from all farmers to whom inputs are being distributed;
  • Submit stock reports in line with Dunavant requirements;
  • Keep detailed accounts for inspection;
  • Obtain credit from the company for inputs;
  • Store inputs prior to disbursement, usually in small self-built sheds or homes;
  • Mobilize the farmers for planting based on history, membership and loan recovery performance;
  • Distribute the loan in the form of inputs; seed, chemicals, sprayers and for some designated trial farmers, fertilizer;
  • Report any problems that may occurs that s/he cannot advise upon;
  • Coordinate harvesting schedules;
  • Coordinate the delivery of the produce to village grading and storage sheds;
  • If the Distributor also acts as a Buyer (for which he has to be numerically literate), he is also responsible for:
  • Weighing the produce
  • Grading the produce;
  • Recording produce weight and grade against the smallholder farmers name and ID number from his/her national registration card; and formatting 
  • Coordinating trans-shipment with Dunavant to regional storage depots

 

Whereas initially Distributors were also responsible for providing extension services, training and technical support to the farmers, this is now the responsibility of the extension staff employed under the Dunavant Yield Programme.

Source:[11] 

Example 2: {Title}

  

Links to Other Examples

Author Title Description of Tool URL Link
       
       
       
       
       

  

 

Footnotes

  1. Grootaert, C. and T. V. Bastelaer (2002). Understanding and Measuring Social Capital: A Multidisciplinary Tool for Practitioners. Washington, D.C., World Bank.
  2. Ypma, P. (2005). Market Survey of Svay Rieng Vegetable Market. Phnom Penh, Agricultural Quality Improvement Project (AQIP) in collaboration with Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and International Development Enterprises (IDE).
  3. ADB (2005). Making Markets Work Better for the Poor: The Participation of the Poor in Agricultural Value Chains - A Case Study of Cassava. Hanoi, Economic and Social Research Center, National Economics University, Informatics Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (ICARD), and Agrifood Consulting International (ACI) for the Making Markets Work Better for the Poor Project, Asian Development Bank.
  4. SNV (2008). Value Chain Development Product Guide. Hanoi, Vietnam, SNV Asia.
  5. Gereffi, G., J. Humphrey, et al. (2003). The Governance of Global Value Chains: An Analytical Framework.
  6. SNV Asia Value Chain Development Product Guide, June 2008
  7. Cato, J. C. and S. Subasinge (2003). Case Study: The Shrimp Export Industry in Bangladesh. Food Safety in Food Security and Food Trade. IFPRI. Washington, D.C., International Food Policy Research Institute,
  8. ITTPC and SNV (2006). Report on Increasing the Competitiveness of Son La Longan Value Chains. Son La, Vietnam, Information for Tourism and Trade Promotion Center, Son La Province and SNV Netherlands Development Organization, Son La Province.
  9. Kaplinsky, R. and M. Morris (2001). A Handbook for Value Chain Research. Brighton, United Kingdom, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex.
  10. ABD (2005). Synthesis Study on Options for Smallholder Commercialization in Zambia: Outgrower Case Sudy - Cotton. Lusaka, Zambia, Prepared for The Government of Zambia and The World Bank by Agro Business Development A/S, Denmark.
  11. ABD (2005). Synthesis Study on Options for Smallholder Commercialization in Zambia: Outgrower Case Sudy - Cotton. Lusaka, Zambia, Prepared for The Government of Zambia and The World Bank by Agro Business Development A/S, Denmark.

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